

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STUDY PROJECT

THE EFFECTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT J. FULCHER, JR.
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USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS: None

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: N/A

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE: N/A

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT: Approved for public release. Unlimited

Distribution is unlimited.

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S):

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S):

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION: U.S. Army War College

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable):

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION:

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): FORBES AVE, ROOT HALL, BLDG 122
CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code):

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable): AWCI

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): FORBES AVE, ROOT HALL, BLDG 122
CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification): The Effects of Conventional Arms Transfers in the Middle East on U.S. Natinal Military Strategy

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S): LTC Robert J. Fulcher

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
MSP	FROM _____ TO _____	93/04/08	29

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

See reverse.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
☑ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS

21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Dr. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II	(717) 245-4057	AWCI

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE EFFECTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert J. Fulcher, Jr. LTC, US Army

TITLE: The Effects of Conventional Arms Transfers In The Middle East On US National Military Strategy

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 4 February 93 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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THE EFFECTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON US NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

The world of 1993 has changed significantly from that which preceded it, mostly as a result of the fall of communism. The Soviet Union, for decades the primary driver of US military strategy, no longer poses a major threat to US security. The threat of a United States - Soviet Union (Russian) military conflict is lower than at any time since the end of World War II.[1] The race between the Soviet Union and the United States to dominate the world with their ideologies is over. Russia is no longer in the running. U.S. and Russian relations do not currently portend a world war.

Now regional conflicts present new threats to world peace. Locally armed powers with modern conventional weapons and ancient ideas pose the new threats to world cooperation in this emerging era.[2] The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has, to a great extent, worked well; nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945. The big challenge to stability in regions critical to U.S. interests is the proliferation of modern conventional weapons. The National Military Strategy of the United States continues to recognize the importance of regional stability and, therefore takes cognizance of the effects of conventional arms transfers as a part of the U.S. foreign policy strategy.

PURPOSE

This study will examine the national strategic implications of continued conventional arms transfers to the Middle East region. Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are the countries of this region, for purposes in this analysis. The role of the U.S. as a major arms supplier with regards to the Middle East will be examined. U.S. interests will be scrutinized through threats associated with regional instability in the Middle East, threats exacerbated by unrestricted conventional arms transfers.

ASSUMPTIONS

Oil will be the world's primary fuel source for at least the next fifty years. The Middle East countries will remain the world's major suppliers of crude oil. The stability of global economies will depend on steady and reasonably priced oil supplies. Russia will continue to turn inward, so she should not pose a renewed threat to the well-being of the United States. The United States will continue as a full service super power. The United States will maintain its technological lead in weapons development and production. The five major arms suppliers of the world the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China[3] will continue to arm countries around the globe. Minor arms suppliers North Korea, Brazil, Spain, Italy, India, Germany, Netherlands,

Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel[4] will continue to produce and export conventional arms. The Islamic religion will still be the primary religion in the Middle East. The state of Israel will continue to exist.

BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II and the start of communist expansion, the Middle East has been of strategic importance to the United States. In 1947 President Truman proposed the Truman Doctrine to Congress. This doctrine overtly directed U.S. policy towards the containment of Soviet communism. Under this doctrine control of the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bab El Mandab, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Turkish Straits would allow the U.S. to keep the Soviet Union bottled up, denying the Soviet rival access to warm water ports in the Middle East. This maritime strategy supported the United States' cold war policy of containment.[5]

In the years which followed, some of the countries in the Middle East became vital to the interests of the United States and to the Soviet Union. U.S. interests in the Middle East require access to cheap oil for both the U.S. and its free-world allies in order to stabilize world economies. The Soviets remained interested in access to warm water ports and the spread of communism. The U.S. and Soviets had been supplying conventional weapons to their respective Middle East allies for decades. During the height of the Cold War, conventional weapons proliferation by both communist and

democratic countries reached its highest points. Arms sales not withstanding, when the Middle East countries engaged in war, their efforts were overshadowed by U.S. - Soviet attempts at detente. It so not important that the fighting between these small countries not upset the detente established between the super powers. Pursuit of detente was successful. The balance was maintained.

Now, for the first time in decades, Middle Eastern countries are receiving the undivided attention of the world powers outside the bipolar context of the Cold War. A new balance must be struck. This paper will examine the effects of conventional proliferation on U.S. National Military Strategy in the Middle East.

U.S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

The historical interests of the United States have not changed with the emergence of a unipolar world. Current U.S. interests are:

> The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
>
> A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
>
> Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
>
> A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.[8]

These interests are critical in the development of U.S.

policy and national military strategy.

U.S. interests can be prioritized from the bottom line of national survival to the ideal goal of improving and expanding the American way of life - with all of its freedoms and its affluences. Consider the following survival scale:

> Survival Interest - The existence of the nation is in peril. The threat is credible, and danger is imminent.
>
> Vital Interest - Probable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures are not taken within a short period of time. Vital interests center on economic, world-order and ideological issues.
>
> Major Interest - Potential harm to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend. These issues can normally be negotiated with an adversary.
>
> Peripheral Interests - Minor interests, little if any harm to the nation if no action is taken. These interests are on the lowest order of the political, economic, or ideological scale. [7]

Actual and perceived U.S. needs relative to other sovereign states may also be considered in establishing the priority for U.S. national interests. For example, if the global standard of living falls precipitously, the U.S. standard would probably decline proportionately, but the U.S. should still remain number one. But being first would not then mean maintaining the former high standard of living.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States has vital and major interests in the Middle East. Given the current world situation, no country in the Middle East has the capability to threaten the survival of the United States. The world community has, thus

far, successfully kept nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems out of the hands of nondemocratic Middle East countries. Thus, nuclear weapons in the Middle East do not currently present a threat to the U.S. homeland. Further, it is not probable that any Middle East country will attempt either an amphibious or an airborne assault against the United States. Therefore, the U.S. has no survival interests in the Middle East.

However, the vital national interests of the United States depend on a stable and secure Middle East.[8] This situation has changed from the 1969-1981 period, when a stable and secure Middle East was a major - but not a vital - interest to U.S. security.[9] In 1993, the availability of Middle East oil to the rest of the industrialized world is necessary to support the U.S. interests in a favorable world order, and global economic well-being. The economies of the major industrialized trading partners of the U.S. are inextricably linked to Middle East oil. A restriction of the flow of Middle East oil to U.S. trading partners will have a vital impact on the economic well-being of the United States. It is a vital interest to the U.S. economy that reasonably priced oil is available to friendly industrialized nations. Without Middle East oil the U.S. and global economies will be adversely affected.

WORLD INTERESTS

The major industrialized countries of the world view the

oil from the Middle East as necessary to the success of their economies. If this is true, then access to Middle Eastern oil is at least a major world interest - possibly a vital interest to the industrialized countries of the world. The following 1989 statistics show the importance of oil from the Middle East to the U.S., Europe, and Japan.

OIL IMPORTS FROM MIDDLE EAST[10]

Region/ Country	Percent of Oil From Middle East
United States	11%
Europe	27%
Japan	62%

U.S. AND MIDDLE EAST OIL RESERVES[11]

Country	World Reserves
United States	3.4%
Saudi Arabia	21.1%
Iraq	12.5%
Kuwait	12.2%
UAE	6.5%
Iran	4.4%

According to this data, Europe and Japan import great amounts of oil from the Middle East region. Additionally more than half of the world's oil reserves are located in this region. The unrestricted flow of reasonably priced oil from this region is vital to the fossil fuel-based economies of the world. Without access to this oil, their economic systems would come under severe strain and would likely fail.

The safety of the routes that control the flow of oil from the Middle East to other parts of the world is just as critical as the oil itself. Modern, industrialized countries

around the world are vitally concerned about the major maritime chokepoints and trade routes that transit the Middle East regions. Again, without the guarantee of security in this region, the economic well being and favorable order of the world will be adversely affected.

The oil, maritime chokepoints and favorable maritime routes into the Middle East are of vital and major interests to the world.

U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

ISRAEL

Since 1948 an enduring U.S. policy in the Middle East has been committed to the security of Israel.[12] Israel has been seen as a reliable ally in the Middle East; she functions as a democratic model in an otherwise undemocratic region. Further, as a fellow democratic state, the United States should expect to depend on the availability of Israeli military facilities, in the event they are needed in a regional crisis. Finally, continued support for Israel is considered necessary to maintaining the credibility of the U.S. to honor its commitments abroad[13]

The United States is the major arms supplier to Israel. The U.S. arms transfer policy to Israel, prior to the Reagan administration, was a critical part of a **de facto** U.S. policy to ensure that Israel maintained a **qualitative edge** of conventional weapons in the Middle East region.[14] This U.S. policy to supply Israel with a **qualitative edge**, over its

Middle East neighbors, in conventional weapons was not voiced in open forum by President Bush until the Bush-Rabin summit in August 1992.[15]

During the Reagan administration both the President and the Secretary of State, in public forums, expressed their support for the **qualitative edge** arms transfer policy to Israel.[16] Until the Bush-Rabin summit, only the Secretary of Defense and mid-level officials in the Departments of State and defense acknowledged the U.S. policy of **qualitative edge** in U.S. Israeli arms transfers.[17] Maintaining Israel's **qualitative edge** in the Middle East is now official U.S. policy. This policy is designed to assist Israel in protecting its sovereignty. The Clinton administration, to date, has made no change in this policy.

SAUDI ARABIA

The United States foreign policy for Saudi Arabia has undergone major revision since the post World War II era. Immediately following the war, U.S. interests were primarily oriented towards Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the start of the Berlin blockade in April 1948, helped to steer American policy away from isolation and towards a more active role in the post-war world.[18] In 1948, the oil of Saudi Arabia was not yet perceived as driving world economics. The big change in U.S.- Saudi Arabian relations started in 1969 with the Nixon's administration

appreciation of abundant low priced Saudi Arabian oil.[19]

In June 1969, the Saudi Arabian government squashed a military plot to overthrow the Saudi king. This attempted coup sent a message to the United States that, like Egypt, Iraq, and Libya, the government of Saudi Arabia was fragile and susceptible to violent overthrow.[20] This resulted in a change in American policy towards Saudi Arabia. The way was cleared for an increase in the sale of conventional arms to Saudi Arabia. The United States took a more active role in training Saudi Arabian military personnel. In 1970, sixty Saudi military personnel were trained in the U.S.. This number rose to 148 in 1973, 382 in 1974, 777 in 1975 and 1503 in 1976.[21] In the fall of 1975 and the spring/summer of 1976, the Saudi government entered into multibillion dollar arms deals with the U.S. for the purchase of modern jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, and tanks.[22] Clearly the U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia had changed. We are now their major arms supplier. The world economic order is closely connected to the availability of reasonably priced Middle East oil, and Saudi Arabia is the major oil supplier in the Middle East, as well as the holder of the greatest reserves in the region.[23] The United States believes that arms sales to Saudi Arabia will protect the world economic order by ensuring the availability of Saudi oil to the world.

EGYPT

The United States policy towards Egypt is really an

extension of the U.S. policy towards Israel; its goal is the stabilization of Arab-Israeli relations in the region.[24] While Egypt controls the Suez Canal, its real value to U.S. foreign policy is Egypt's cooperation in maintaining a peaceful coexistence with Israel.

During the twenty year period from 1955 - 1975 Egypt was closely aligned with the Soviet Union. However, at the end of this period Soviet - Egyptian relations collapsed. The Soviets had nothing to show for twenty years of effort in Egypt.[25]

After the Arab - Israeli war of October 1973, the U.S. filled a diplomatic void in Egypt left by the Soviet Union. This was the start of the serious U.S. - Egyptian foreign relations.[26] The Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty signed in March 1979, at Camp David, was a major step in Arab - Israeli relations and a foreign affairs triumph of the Carter administration.[27] Unfortunately for the Egyptian government, U.S. - Egyptian cooperation was initially criticized by Egyptians opposed to the favorable U.S. relations.[28] However, as a result of the recent Coalition victory in the Gulf War, Egypt has emerged as a strong player in the Middle East peace process. Additionally Egypt has received handsome rewards from the Western powers and Gulf allies for its support during the Gulf War.[29] Egypt is finally receiving positive benefits through its role in U.S. - Egyptian - Israeli alignments. U.S. arms sales to Egypt have increased.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

On July 8-9, 1991, representatives from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (Perm 5) met in Paris to review issues related to conventional arms transfers.[30] The representatives agreed they would not transfer conventional weapons to countries if such transfers would contribute to regional instability.[31] President Bush, French President Mitterrand , and British Prime Minister Major agreed that the Middle East was the region most vulnerable to destabilization as a result of arms transfers.[32]

The members of the meeting acknowledged that unrestricted regional conventional arms transfers must be conducted openly, so all parties could assess their potential for destabilization. They agreed to support the United Nations efforts to establish an arms transfers register which would increase visibility of arms transfers.[33] The convening countries recognized the right of a nation to acquire arms for legitimate self-defense, security, and preservation of national sovereignty; it could also participate in military actions deemed appropriate by the United Nations.[34] Given the huge amounts of available money in the Middle East, indiscriminate transfers of conventional weapons and advanced technology will occur. These arms transfers will likely, then cause instability in the Middle East. In the interest

of preventing regional instability the members of the meeting agreed to avoid arms transfers that:

> Prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict;
>
> Increase tension or contribute to regional instability;
>
> Introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a region;
>
> Violate embargo or other relevant internationally agreed upon restraints;
>
> Are used for other than the legitimate defense and security needs of the receiving state.[35]

These initiatives are important steps taken by the Perm 5 of the United Nations Security Council to control conventional arms transfers. The United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China accounted for 78% of all 1985-1989 arms transfers in the Middle East.[36] Attempts to monitor and control conventional arms transfers will not be successful without the assistance and cooperation of the Perm-5. These countries must continue their efforts to promote regional stability in the Middle East through constraints on conventional arms sales and transfers. The Perm-5 members must encourage all responsible arms producing countries to participate actively in the previously stated arms transfers guidelines. These actions will strengthen the conventional weapons nonproliferation efforts.

MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES

In May 1991, President Bush established a Middle East arms control plan aimed at limiting arms sales in the region. The major tenets of the plan allow U.S. arms sales in the

Middle East to countries friendly to the U.S.; these arms sales are intended to enhance the friendly countries' self-defense capabilities.[37] But this plan is not working. U.S. arms sales continue to most countries in the Middle East. It appears that other arms producing countries are making similar agreements with countries in the Middle East. In 1988-1991, arms sales to Middle East countries totalled $26.8 billion dollars (1992 dollars).[38] What are the effects of these sales and the subsequent conventional weapons proliferation in the Middle East? How does such proliferation affect U.S. military strategy?

REARMING IRAN AND IRAQ

Future oil revenues for Iran and Iraq will provide these countries with the hard currency they need to purchase arms from China, Russia, and other weapons producing countries needing hard currency. The current United Nations embargo on Iraq is thwarting Saddam Hussein's efforts to re-arm.[38] However, it is unrealistic to think that both Iran and Iraq will not rearm as fast as imposed restrictions will allow them. Iran also has oil money with which to purchase weapons. Keeping in mind, that Iran's military machine will prosper at the expense of her domestic economy, her rearmament efforts will probably exceed Iraq's efforts - placing Iran in a position (within the next 10 years) to militarily threaten Iraq.

The current regional balance in the Middle East really favors Israel.[40] However, Israel is not expected to initiate an unprovoked attack on either Iraq or Iran. Nor is Israel considered, by the U.S., to be the aggressor state. Instead the major concern in the Middle East is a rearmed Iraq or a rearmed Iran and the destabilizing effect such a situation may cause in the region.

BALANCE OF FORCES

The key to developing U.S. military strategy in the Middle East region lies in assessing correctly the current and future military threats in the region. Using unclassified sources, the Congressional Budget Office has conducted current and future estimates of the force structures and weapon inventories of critical Middle East countries.[41] The scoring system used to measure military capabilities was developed for the Department of Defense by The Analytical Sciences Corporation (TASCFORM). The system assesses the capability of military ground forces (tanks, artillery, other armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, antitank weapons, etc) and tactical air forces (fighters, fighter bombers, and bombers).[42] The ground force measure of 1 is equivalent to one U.S. armored division with 350 M1A1 tanks and associated equipment. The air force measure of 1 is equivalent to a U.S. air wing with 100 F-16C/D and associated equipment.[43] Additionally these units of measure make allowances for the purchases of new equipment

and the upgrade of existing equipment. New equipment is assumed to be added to the unit's force structure as new units. Listed below are 1991 and projected 2002 force structures for critical Middle East countries:

	1991		2002 W/LIMITS		W/O LIMITS	
COUNTRY	GROUND	AIR	GROUND	AIR	GROUND	AIR[44]
Israel	4.5	3.7	5.5	4.7	na	
Syria	3.3	2.9	4.0	3.3	na	
Iraq	2.1	2.0	2.7	2.6	5-6	3.0
Iran	1.3	1.3	2.7	2.7	5-6	3.0
Saudi Arabia	0.2	1.6	1.9	2.1	na	

These are the forces that U.S. military strategy must be based on - that it must be prepared to deter or engage in order to maintain peace in the region.

U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

The current national military strategy must address a radically altered global situation. The forces that provided the form and substance of American military power for fifty years are being drawn down and restructured. The U.S. military strategy has changed focus from the goal of containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to the goal of being able to meet more diverse, more regionally oriented threats, with a rapid world wide deployment capability.[45] The threat faced by America resides largely in not knowing where the next war will occur. The real threat facing the U.S. is regional instability. The major mission for our forces is to develop the capability to

handle efficiently, the unexpected crisis.[46] The United States is the only full service super power with the military capability to deploy globally and influence stability through-out the world. The U.S. response to the " new threat " must be grounded in the U.S. capability to respond to regional crises throughout the world.[47]

The U.S. strategy in the Middle East, as elsewhere, is based on the foundations of strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution.[48] The U.S. forces present an extremely credible deterrent in the region. No other forces in the region have the modern, reliable early warning systems, the nuclear response capabilities, or the sophisticated defense systems that the U.S. is capable of employing.[49] The United States has demonstrated the strategic agility to employ forces in the Middle East in sufficient numbers to defend friendly countries. During the Gulf War, the U.S. led coalition was able to amass enough forces to initiate offensive actions with the assurance of a quick victory with minimal loss of U.S. life.

The ability to respond rapidly to a crisis in the Middle East is enhanced by the U.S. strategy of forward presence in the region. Rotational deployments, port visits, military - to - military contacts, combined exercises, and access and storage agreements give credibility to the U.S. capability to respond to regional crisis. This response is a function of the power projection capabilities of the United

States. The strategic value of U.S. power projection from CONUS and forwarded-deployed bases extends former crisis response capabilities. It is a critical part of the U.S. military strategy. U.S. power projection and forward presence is a constant contributor to deterrence, regional stability, and collective security.[50]

CONTINGENCY FORCES

The U.S. strategy for handling spontaneous, unpredictable crises throughout the world calls for the use of contingency forces. These forces must be fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deployable; they must be initially self-sufficient. These contingency forces will come primarily from the active force structure; they will be tailored into joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each service and the special operations forces from the services.[51] The tailored forces are then used by either the regional Commander in Chief (CINC) or the Joint Task Force Commander to respond to the regional threat.

The structure for the contingency forces is first established by the Joint Staff through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The Joint Staff apportions forces to the regional CINC based on the threats to U.S. interests and the threats to the region. After the apportionment of forces, the CINC will make assessments regarding the ability of his assigned forces to accomplish the mission. During the assessment of enemy strengths and

weaknesses the U.S. strategy will get its first critical tests of functionality and operational capabilities. It is during this assessment that the U.S. strategy makers must ensure that all considerations have been given to the proliferation of technologically advanced conventional weapons. In the CINC's assessment of the capabilities of his contingency forces, he must also include the capabilities of the threat forces, and the effects of any technologically advanced weapons in his Area of Responsibility (AOR). The CINC in the Middle East region should be concerned about regional high technology weapons and the numbers and types of weapons in the AOR. The sophistication and types of weapons in the region must be included in the CINC's assessment in order for his assessment to correctly reflect enemy capabilities, and the requirement for U.S. forces to overcome these enemy capabilities. Desert Shield and Desert Storm have provided valuable lessons to U.S. forces, however we cannot assume that future conflicts in the Middle East will precisely mirror, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Instead we must realize that future conflicts in the region will be different and may require a change in strategy driven in part the change in armaments.

Future U.S. involvement in regional military actions must be combined operations. The Gulf War proved the high value of an effective coalition in winning a war with minimal casualties. Unilateral efforts by the United States to resolve the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait surely would have

resulted in higher U.S. casualties.

Strategies dealing with regional forces in the Middle East must address the technology, training, and quality of the equipment and people of the region. My personal experience during the Gulf War leads me to question the ability of the Iraqi forces to use technologically advanced equipment. On more than one occasion after either the capture or destruction of Iraqi equipment, I found some parts of the enemy's equipment to be inoperative - because of operator error. Thermal viewers on tanks were covered with paint, which rendered them dysfunctional. Equipment designed to defeat the U.S. anti-tank missile systems were not properly installed, so they simply did not work. The Iraqi army possessed the technology for limited visibility operations; however their soldiers were not trained in either limited visibility operations or the use of limited visibility technology. As we learned more about the Iraqi's inability to use the available technology, we were able to engage them more boldly and directly. U.S. military strategy should include an assessment of the regional combatant's capability to use the equipment that is on hand and available in the region. But we should certainly not assume that a potential adversary's technology is inferior to ours simply because the adversary has not learned to use it effectively. Such an assumption could breed complacency, with fatal results. Also, we cannot justify arms proliferation on the assumption that the recipients will

never use it effectively. Someday, sometime, somewhere a well-prepared, technically proficient adversary may be waiting for us -- armed to the teeth.

CONCLUSIONS

The National Military Strategy of the United States does acknowledge the fall of Soviet communism. The strategy has been adjusted to reflect the changes in the new world order. The current National military strategy reflects the U.S. acknowledgment that regional threats are more dangerous to the U.S. interests than those now posed by the former Soviet Union. The U.S. military strategy is oriented towards regional threats. In this era of decreasing resources and downsizing of U.S. forces, it is absolutely critical that keen assessments be made of regional capabilities that could affect U.S. interests.

The U.S. strategy is now oriented towards stabilization of conventional weapons, maintaining a technological edge of weapon systems, and maintaining peace in the regions. Unrestricted weapon transfers will eventually upset the power balances in the regions. Depending on both the size and types of weapon transfers in the Middle East, U.S. forces could be subjected to high casualties and possible defeat in the first battle. U.S. strategy in the Middle East must continue to address conventional arms control policies in the Middle East, and must continue to focus on the goal of regional stability.

The U.S. current strategies and policies for the Middle East are probably sound until the year 2002. During this time period no major changes are anticipated; there should be no decline in the U.S. technology leads, quality of personnel in the armed forces, or training of Department of Defense personnel. Under these circumstances the United States will remain the agent of stability in the Middle East.

In the process of using conventional weapons transfers and sales to stabilize the region; U.S. policies and practices must be both fair and consistent. If the U.S. is viewed by the Islamic nations as too supportive of Israel, then the U.S. will lose effectiveness as the key stabilizing player in the region. Countries feeling threatened by what they see as unfair regional arms build up will purchase weapons from any country that will sell them. Then the conventional arms race will escalate, and the U.S. will lose its role as a major regional stabilizer.

As long as access to strategic natural resources (oil) and freedom of navigation are U.S. vital interests, then U.S. strategy must include plans for the commitment of forces in the region. If we commit U.S. forces to stabilize a heavily armed region our risks increase. Our options are: accept the risks, but attempt to lower them through arms control measures; increase our forces, which is probably not possible in the time frame under discussion; or be a proactive player in the conventional arms control process, with the aim of maintaining a stabilizing balance. We must ensure that U.S.

arms control policies are consistent with U.S. arms transfer and sales practices. Failure to do so will result in increased lose to the U.S. in money and lives.

END NOTES

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[2]Ibid., 9.

[3]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1991 World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 230-231.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted United States National Interests in the 1980s (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 105-108.

[6]The White House, 3-4.

[7]Nuechterlein, 6-14.

[8]The White House, 28.

[9]Nuechterlein, 204-207.

[10]Stephen J. Neuendorf, The Persian Gulf - U.S. Interests And Policy (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1990),7.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., American National Security Policy and Process (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 395.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Director U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project Dr. Dore Gold, US Policy Toward Israel's Qualitative Edge JCSS Memorandum no. 36, Tel Aviv, September 1992.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Benson Lee Grayson, Saudi-American Relations (Washington: University Press of America, 1982), 77.

[19]Ibid., 103.

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[20]Ibid., 103.

[21]Ibid., 103-104.

[22]Ibid., 123.

[23]Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 300.

[24]William B. Quandt, The United States and Egypt (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1990), 1-2.

[25]Ibid., 11.

[26]Ibid., 12-13.

[27]Ibid.,18-19.

[28]Dore Gold, America, The Gulf and Israel: CENTCOM (Central Command) And Emerging US Regional Security Policies In The Mideast (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1988), 77-79.

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[30]United States Department of State, " Meeting of The Five On Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation," Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Michael T. Klare, Conventional Arms Transfers: Exporting Security or Arming Adversaries, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 7.

[36]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991), 23.

[37]Congressional Budget Office, Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, September 1992), 19-20.

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[38]Ibid., 16.

[39]Ibid., 16.

[40]Ibid., 65.

[41]Ibid., 81.

[42]Ibid., 81.

[43]Ibid., 82.

[44]Ibid., 84.

[45]Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy Of The United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 1.

[46]Ibid., 4.

[47]Ibid., 7.

[48]Ibid., 6-7.

[49]Ibid., 6.

[50]Ibid., 10.

[51]Ibid., 23.

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